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IF OPPOSITES ATTRACT, THEN PERHAPS

there is an explanation

The Pullman
Group's
Securitization
of the Music
Industry
By Hewson Chen

An Interview
with David
Pullman

for the

unlikely marriage between rock 'n
roll and the bond market. One can
only wonder what strange magnetism is powerful enough to wed the
"youthful, wild and unpredictable"
rock culture with the world of "dry,
cautious, and mind-numbingly technical" investment finance. 1 Indeed,
some strange voodoo

magic has

luminaries like David Bowie, James
Brown, and Holland-Dozier-Holland
all singing the same tune, and "secu2
ritization" is its name.

Securitization is the selling of debt to investors. 3 In
general, securitization converts future income streams
like credit card receivables or auto loan payments to

18
out being forced to sell off the artist's catalog.
As the innovator who first married securitization to
star power, David Pullman is one of few financiers who

present in-pocket cash. Notably, this transformation
from future income to current wealth gives the issuer of
the security immediate access to cash at less cost than
other financing methods such as bank loans. 4 In the

can successfully structure such deals, and, in fact, such
bonds bear his name in industry vernacular. The overall
idea behind a "Pullman Bond" is that the artist makes
money up front by selling bonds to investors. The inter-

1970s, this technique was applied to the housing industry,5 and since then, securitization has evolved into
greater varieties of income streams, including medical
insurance, 6 typhoon insurance, and unused airline tick-

est on these bonds is then paid with the income stream
resulting from certain assets, typically a catalog of songs.
A number of steps ensures that risks to the investor
are minimized. The income producing assets are insulated from possible bankruptcy proceedings by transferring the assets temporarily from the artist to a special

ets. 7 The application of securitization in the entertainment industry, however, remains largely untested.
Is securitization a viable model for financing intellectual properties in the music industry? David Pullman,

purpose vehicle ("SPV"). 19 Credit enhancements such as
cash reserve accounts, financial guarantees, letters of
credit, or default insurance may be used to reduce the
risk of default of payment on the bonds. 20 Finally, an

Founder, Chairman, and CEO of The Pullman Group,
LLC, thinks so. In 1997, Pullman, as managing director
of Fahnestock & Company's Structured Asset Sales
Group, successfully orchestrated the issuance of $55 mil-

artist's works may be pooled with the works of other
artists to diversify "the risk that a particular artist's
popularity may decrease and affect future royalty

lion in bonds backed by singer David Bowie's royalty and
publishing income. 8 To date, Pullman has proven the
viability of this concept by issuing similar bonds for legendary artists like James Brown, 9 Holland-DozierHolland, 10 and Ashford & Simpson. 1 1 These music leg-

21
payments negatively."
However, there are many critics who remain skeptical
of entertainment securitization. Some of the banks that
have tried to enter the entertainment securitization market now dismiss the deals to be "more about hype than

ends are interested in securitizing because these deals
12
The
promise several benefits to the established artist.
securitization deal is more attractive than a traditional
royalty/advance agreement because the artist retains
100 percent of the copyright, generates an immediate

value." 2 2

Pullman regards these criticisms as grumblings from disgruntled competitors. 2 3 "When I did the
Bowie deal people thought I was crazy," he notes. "Three
months after I started it, other people tried to copy me.
Six months later, it was everyone else's idea. We keep
' 24
going at it. Other people have tried and failed.

monetary windfall, and saves money on taxes because
13
the sale of the bonds is not treated as a taxable event.
Securitization deals are more attractive than bank loans.
Unlike bank loans, which are short-term in nature and
involve a floating rate, Pullman's securities are fixed

His failed competition only underscores the complexity and expertise required in the field. Well-known
Nomura Capital Entertainment announced that it was
going to form a music securitization team with industry

rate, non-recourse, and long-term in nature, translating
into less risk for the artist. 14 Also, bank loans typically
only yield about one-tenth what the artist can get
through securitization. 15 According to the Pullman

veterans

and

Casey

loans. 26 By March 1998, however, Nomura had not produced one asset-backed security.2 7 By the beginning of
1999, Nomura fired its top bond executive, Ethan Penner,
and closed its entertainment bonds division with only one
2
small entertainment loan to show for it. 8

additional indirect advantages. "By gaining control of
the net sum of future royalties today, the artist can reinvest and diversify,"' 17 making the artist's wealth less

The only other competitor in this field, CAK Universal
Credit Corp., was formed in 1998 as an alliance between
Prudential Securities and Charles Koppelman, former

dependent on the success or failure of any specific market. Moreover, the ability to control the net value of
future royalties today facilitates estate planning, so the
artist's heirs will have money available to pay taxes with-

Romero,

Wasserman in 1997.25 In 1998, they expected to use the
"artist-pooling" concept to issue $1 billion a year in

Group, the benefits of securitization translate into at
least 20 percent extra income for the artist. 16
This increased amount of money up-front can result in

-I-

Irving Azoff, Irene

chairman of the EMI Capitol Music Group. 2 9 While the
group claimed to have made $300 million in fixed loans
1+

t

to unidentified artists, its attempt to securitize Michael
Jackson's catalog of Beatles classics has encountered

average record company. "[We deal with] people who are
already successful and are legends with a steady income

delays and may well be scrapped due to the complexity of
the ownership structure. 30 Rivalry in this field has a
personal side as well.
CAK and Prudential were
Pullman's business partners in the 1997 Bowie bond

stream, and, in general, the majority of artists in a record
company's roster don't fit that example. We're dealing

offering. He is now suing both for, among other things,
violating fiduciary duties and the misappropriation of
31
trade secrets, claiming damages in excess of $2 billion.

This focus on artists of legendary stature also allows
Pullman to avoid the uncertainty of predicting the popu-

While some analysts have noted that such legal wrangling may make artists uneasy about doing securitization
deals, Pullman does not believe the lawsuit will hurt his
business: "People love the fact that all we're trying to do is protect intellectual property, whether it be ours or the artist's."32
The main reason behind Pullman's heavy market
share of the music bonds industry is that "the assets are
complex." 33 As he observes, it is a "world-wide industry"
with "world-wide cash flows."' 34 For example, the Bowie

with a select few, the cream of the crop, in terms of artists
38
that have longevity."

larity of entertainers in a fickle market. With regard to
songs that have achieved "classic" status, income
streams are relatively stable. For example, "with Ziggy
Stardust it's nearly 30 years later and we know if it's still
producing income 30 years later--remember with artists,
90 percent of the income comes in the first 6 months after
release--so if this song's producing this 30 years out,
'39
that's what it should do going forward.
But with business limited to artists of legendary status, some think that the real money to be made from

BY GAINING CONTROL OF THE NET SUM OF FUTURE
ROYALTIES TODAY, THE ARTIST CAN REINVEST AND DIVERSI]
MAKING THE ARTIST'S WEALTH LESS DEPENDENT ON TI-IE
SI ICCESS OR FAIl. URF OF ANY SPFECIFIC MARKET_

I

ISI JCCEIRS OR EAT1,11RE OF ANY SPECIFIC MARKET
deal took months to devise, cost over a million dollars,
35
and resulted in a thousand pages of documentation.
But even with the experience of numerous music securitization deals, Pullman notes that these transactions are
still difficult to orchestrate: "I thought that after doing a
series of these deals, things would get easier, and they
haven't. So that's what's amazing about it all--that they
'36
don't become cookie cutter.
Indeed, the difficulty of creating deals and the few successes of music securitization may well limit music bonds

intellectual property securitization lies outside of the
music industry.4 0 In 1997, an attorney who worked with
Pullman on the Bowie Bond deal observed that "the
music business is a limited market.... But if you can get
to the software companies, then this could be a huge
business. ' 4 1 However, Pullman remains optimistic about
the future of music bonds. Despite the music industry's
focus on short-term artists with one- to three-record
careers and the implication that the pool of viable securitization candidates is dwindling, Pullman maintains:

to the fringes of the industry. Some commentators have
said that music securities are "lousy investments," where
"the seller is smarter than the buyer. '3 7 This potential
information asymmetry also raises policy concerns.

We're just at the beginning of [music securitization]. What [the increasing focus on short-

Securitization shifts the risk of success or failure from
the record company and publisher onto the investor, who

Simpson, or Holland-Dozier-Holland...

is in arguably the worst position to assess the odds.
Instead, the risk of a particular catalog is perhaps most
efficiently allocated to record companies and publishers,
who have ready access to income stream histories and
industry tracking data. Pullman counters this criticism
by pointing out that his focus is different from that of the

term artists] is really doing is making catalogs
like James Brown, David Bowie, Ashford and
more

valuable, because there are fewer people creating catalogs that have standards, or that have
long careers or that have created a new sound.
So we think that's better, that we have these
gems that don't really have to compete with a
lot of the different artists that are out there....
James Brown doesn't compete against a new
j ___________

m

1

artist. In fact, James Brown, the Isley Brothers,
these guys are sampled over and over again by
42
[new artists]. So is Ashford and Simpson.

Furthermore, the slow adoption of music securitization should be no surprise. Pullman points out that traditional securities markets also encountered hesitation
and skepticism in their infancy:
I started when there was not one auto loan or
credit card security. Asset-backed securities
were brand new, [but] it kept evolving. Newer
and newer asset classes.... Around 1990, not
all banks did securitization, and a lot of banks
questioned it. In the year 2000, there's not one
bank that doesn't securitize its assets. They
were all naysayers about securitization, the

0i

deal than sell [their works]. And with the consolidation of the industry, artists want the
45
flexibility to go where they can.
One of the reasons why securitization will likely be
viewed with greater acceptance is that securitization provides a potential win-win opportunity for record companies as well. Specifically, as a result of securitization,
[record companies] have more money in their
coffers to offer other artists, as opposed to all
of their money going out to one artist... So if
we're talking about a $30 million James
Brown deal or a $55 million David Bowie deal,
[obtaining that money from the sale of bonds
instead of from record company advances]
gives these companies more money to put out

RIN TERMS OF THE FIRST DEAL WITH BOWIE, PEOPLE SAID THAT
E COULDN'T REPEAT IT. NOW ME'RE ABLE TO OBTAIN RATINGS
ON DEALS THAT ARE USST
ASED
E ON THE
ITERS SHARE,
banks, just the way that they are about enter43
tainment royalty securitization.
Over time, Pullman predicts, music securitization will
become more commonplace, and there is some indication
that Pullman has successfully raised awareness and

for new artists. Think of it this way: 55 million
is the equivalent of 55 one million dollar
advances, 550 hundred thousand dollar
advances, and 5500 ten thousand dollar advances.
So you can sign on more new artists... 46

acceptance about these more progressive bonds. Though
the Bowie deal was partially guaranteed by EMI
Records, the later Holland-Dozier-Holland deal was
44
struck without any similar guarantee.

At least for now, the proponents of music securitization are in a dilemma. Securitization promises to revolutionize the music industry, yet it is still so obscure that

I think that each year we move further and
further down the line. So in terms of the first
deal with Bowie, people said that we couldn't
repeat it... that it was a one-time event, and
that it was unique, that he had his record masters and publishing and the writer's share.
And now we're able to obtain ratings on deals
that are just based on the writer's share, probably something that most artists still retain....
So, therefore, I think that each year we'll go
further and further out on the curve. And then
at some point in time meet with what the
record companies and publishers have traditionally done as a business. Right now I think
[record companies and entertainment bond
firms] complement each other more. But the
future is that, what I hear in terms of feedback, is that artists would much rather do this

only one firm, the Pullman Group, has been able to make
it work. Even so, the pro-artist values advanced by
music securitization should be encouraged in an industry
where record companies of increasing size flex overwhelming bargaining power over artists. Securitization
remains intensely specialized and somewhat untested in
the music business. But does it also promote democracy
47
and diversity in the recording industry? "Definitely,"
says David Pullman, the only man who, so far, seems to
be able to make the bonds sing.
The author would like to thank David Pullman for his kind assistance.

A Conversation with

T1 rvid Pullman

You'd already had a bit of experience securitizing exotic income sources by the time the Bowie

P: Right. Well those are the generic, but
then after that, each time everything was new,
like credit cards were new, autos were new,

Bond deal came about. Had you been planning to do
this for quite some time prior to your discussions with
Zysblatt [Bowie's business manager] or Bowie?

Pullman

and then it kept on going down the line.
I

In terms of the Bowie deal, I had been think-

From a policy standpoint, securitization

shifts all of the risk from success or failure
from the record company to the artist and then

ing about doing things in entertainment and
intellectual property. In my mind, that's the direction I

some of that to the investor. But couldn't we

wanted to go. I always had an interest in the entertainment business, in terms of whether I'd be reading
BILLBOARD, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, or VARIETY, somehow

argue that the record company, with all of its
expertise, is in the best position to accurately
calculate and deal with this risk, or would you

I would connect what I'm doing with that.

disagree with that?

J:so it was more of a personal interest?

P: Could you ask me that question again?

P:Yes.

I

The risk of success or failure of the under-

lying assets that are paying the interest on

I You've said in television interviews that, had you

these bonds ... that's being shifted to the
investor through the artist, right? So the traditional model is where the record company

tried to offer Pullman Bonds maybe ten years ago, it
never would have worked. What changed in the marketplace that suddenly made this Bowie deal possible?

gives you an advance, promises to pay you royalties, but there's a risk involved: that the
record company will never make back that

P: Well what happened in this market was evolutionary, in the fact that, when I began, I started in mortgage-backed securities which were new at the time. At

advance. So all of the risk of failure is pretty
much on the record company. But now,

the time I started there was not one auto loan security,
not one credit card security. Asset-backed securities

through securitization, we're shifting the risk
from the record company to the artist. And of

were brand new. So that's what I mean. It kept evolving. Newer and newer asset classes. It would have

course, with the risk there's also the increased
potential for return because the artist gets
more of the upside. But do you think that

been difficult to do this at the time when mortgagebacked securities first started, because you have to keep

record companies are more able to predict the

breaking the ground to new arenas first. Timing is
everything and so are rating agencies and the investors.
But even though this was very difficult to do, I thought

success, failure, or worth of an artist's catalog
than the average investor or institutional
investor?

it was possible, not impossible.

P: Well, these are already people who are

I So it was kind of like the industry had to get more
used to these exotic income streams like credit receiv-

successful and are legends so it's an income
stream, and in general, the majority of artists

ables and such.
165_

in a record company's roster don't fit that example. So
we're dealing with a select few, the cream of the crop, in

ruptcy laws...

terms of the artists that have longevity.

P: We move the assets into a special purpose bankruptcy remote vehicle.

J

One concern of people in the music industry is that
ideal candidates for securitization such as David Bowie

J: Right. And that transaction has to be treated as a...

or James Brown are decreasing in number because consumer tastes are growing more fickle and there are
more short term artists with just one- to three-record

P: As a true sale. What's unique about securitization

careers. Do you think that the number of viable music

be able to retain the equity residuals. Only in securiti-

securitization deals is likely to decrease over time, or do
you think that that won't really be an issue?

zation can you do that, and also be able to deduct the
interest. One treatment for taxes and financing, and on

P: We're just at the beginning of it. What it's really
doing is making catalogs like James Brown, David

is you can get a true sale opinion and at the same time

the other side you're getting an opinion that's a true
sale.

Bowie, Ashford and Simpson, or Holland-Dozier-Holland

J: So you can be treated as a loan while at the same

more valuable, because there are fewer people creating

time, for bankruptcy purposes, have a true sale. What
about the possibility that the IRS may change its regu-

catalogs that have standards, or that have long careers
or creating a sound. So we think that that's better, that
we have these gems that don't really have to compete
with a lot of the different artists that are out there.

lations?

P:

No, it's based on Code. It's like a mortgage. If they

try to turn around the code and say if you've got a mort-

J
P:

So that makes the existing catalogs even stronger.

gage on your house, it's a sale, people would be up in
arms.

They're more valuable. I mean James Brown does-

the Isley Brothers, they're sampled by anyone. So is

That makes sense. What about the true sale doctrine? Is that firm enough for entertainment securitiza-

Ashford and Simpson.

tion to become more mainstream? Is there a need for

J

Congress or the SEC to make more firm guidelines to
really shield these assets?

two, significant tax advantages. How do these tax

P: It's the same way in the other securitization deals.

advantages work out? Where does the benefit come
from?

There's 200 billion done a year, so the same rules that

P: From the fact that it's not a taxable event when
you receive the money.

change the rules for everything else and they're not
going to because it's a large market.

n't compete against a new artist. In fact, James Brown,

The two main financial advantages of securitization
are, one, the artist gets to retain all the upside, and

I

Is this a benefit to the investor or to the artist?

P: To the artist.
So you're talking about the up-front cash.
P: Exactly. And then when the money's invested, for
business purposes, whether it be in stocks and bonds or
buying catalogs, the interest is deductible.
I

But in order for the assets to be shielded from bank-

I

protect those and the two and half trillion outstanding
protect the individual deals we do. They would have to

J

What makes entertainment securitization different
than the ABS [Asset Backed Securities] market in general?
P: The assets are intangible, that's a big difference.
And the difference is not that the structures are so
much more complex-and they are-but the assets are
so complex. And I thought that after a doing a series of
these deals things would get easier, and they haven't.
So that's what's amazing about it all, that they don't

become cookie cutter.
I

I'd read somewhere that in the ABS market there

was a trend of really destructive competition, that competition for borrowers was making the payoff of these
deals worse. But since entertainment securitization is
so complex, is this not an issue?
P: It hasn't been. People have tried to compete with
us, or bait and switch. And then it turns out that it's so
complex that they can never deliver what they say. So
whatever we say we stuck to, and you have to stick with
certain guidelines in terms of what your fees and interests are going to be on deals, especially as you get to
doing smaller deals. As you go down in terms of the
size of the deal, they become just as difficult as doing a
large deal, so you have to make sure you have the right
pricing model so that you make sure that you're making
money and not losing money on the deal.

I

BUSINESS WEEK

wrote about the destabilizing effect

that the ABS market had on the economy. It mentioned
specifically that the market has tended towards excess:
Too much liquidity in good times, too little in bad. Does
this affect entertainment securitization?
P: Well, these are fixed income instruments, so it's a
little different, it's based on the ratings, and we're being
given single A ratings.
J: So liquidity isn't much of a concern at all.
P: Right. It's typically tremendous liquidity, people
leave equities and they go into debt instruments, bonds.
And they want to get the highest possible yield on
bonds, so we're in good shape. The aspect market has
ridden a huge wave, even through the recession. The
issuance in '85 was about 5 billion, and the issuance in
the last year was about 200 billion.
I

Some have noted that CAK Universal Credit Corp. is

a strong competitor, because they have Koppleman's
years of experience as former chairman of EMI, and the
nearly unlimited resources that Prudential can funnel
into a venture. Additionally, CAK has access to the
details of the Bowie Bond deal. Were you expecting
that this might happen at some point?

P: No, I wasn't expecting that someone would try to
steal our stuff and try to get away with it, and that we
would file a $2.5 billion lawsuit against CAK and
Prudential. Imitation is the highest form of flattery,
that's how we feel about competition-except when
someone tries to steal our stuff, and then we sue them.
So that's what we did, and it's kept them busy. People
love the fact that all we're trying to do is protect intellectual property whether it be ours or the artist's.
I So what steps do you think you could take to protect
yourself from similar problems like this in the future?
P: The first thing I did which was smart was that I
didn't do any public deals. They were all done as private deals. So we got a thousand requests for our documents, which we never gave out, and each deal's been a
derivation of the last.
J: Is the main reason behind limiting these deals to
institutional investors because you want to avoid an
SEC filing or...

P:

No, we don't mind. The main thing is we want the
privacy and we want people to not be able to reverse
engineer our deals. Down the road, as we continue to
build the brand, the Pullman Bonds, we could go to the
public market. Because that's traditionally what happens once you're a market leader and you build a brand,
even in other asset-backed securities. For example, Pru
Securities, they're known for home equity loans, First
Boston might be known for autos and credit cards, and
that's it. And Conti Financial, before they went out of
business, was known for time shares.
J: I've noticed that the film and sports industries have
seen a diversity of players entering the securitization
arena: Dreamworks, Polygram, England's Newcastle
sports team, and Ascent Entertainment are all offering their own bonds. But in music securitization,
specifically, it's really only in the hands of just one
group, your Pullman group. So why is music securitization different?

P:

Because stadium financing for a team is more akin
to the combination of municipal bond financing and
securitzation. So it's more of a relationship with the

and there's more upside for the record company on that

investment bank.

side of the business than there is on the side of the
established artist. For the established artist, it's more

J: So those things are more comfortable with existing
financing models? What about film securitization?
P:

of a banking function-people say that's why it's a better fit, whether it be for the royalty streams or for the
publishing income. Music is a better fit than TV and

Film is another example where you've seen it's

film for right now because in some cases, in music the
copyrights are owned by the artist, whereas in almost
all cases in film and TV, the work is owned or copyright-

diversified. It's more of a banking function. It's short
term, which is the opposite of our deals, which are long
term. It's floating rate, which is the opposite of our
deals, which are fixed rate. So because of that, you'd

ed by the studio and is a work for hire. So the artists
may have a percentage interest but they won't have

see very few that would be able to do deals because you
need studio credit. So for instance, Disney traditional-

ownership or control. So that's why music is better.
Better assets, more diversified, it's a world-wide indus-

ly had a relationship with First Boston, so you see First
Boston do a deal. Or someone has a relationship with
Citibank, so they make a deal, that's what happens.

try, world-wide cash flows, they're more evergreen titles.
The great music goes up in value overtime, whereas, for
film, they traditionally drop in value over time.

J: These studios are already linked to banks, so it's a
comfortable move.

J

P:

ues promoted by commercializing intellectual property,
but it turns out that the values promoted by securitization are likely the things that we've always wanted to

Exactly.

J:

The interesting thing is that people question the val-

promote: democracy and diversity.

You've mentioned that securitization doesn't just
benefit the artist, it benefits the record company as
well, creating a win-win deal. What's the benefit for the

: Definitely.

*

record company?

P: They have more money in their coffers to offer
other artists, as opposed to all of their money going out
to one artist... So you can sign on more new artists,
out
artists,
offer
more
all
you
opposed
artist...
r. going
. . . . . ..
' to
, Ltsign
LJn'of
]'on
'""their
t. coffers
' money
" new
.. f . to
Pie
f;l
l f as
A,
i ASo
R ,can
one artists,
their
to
other
in
P: They have more money
'

.

FUTURE SECURITIZATION
Non-recourse
Fixed rate for life of deal
2
Self-liquidating
Long-term deal
10 year average life
15 year maturity
Non-taxable self liquidating event, artist pays taxes as earned over
years and interest is deductible
Artist keeps 100 percent of copyright
Audits done every year on sources of income
Artist has all upside in the event of extraordinary new income
If catalogue is worth twice as much in 10 years, it belongs to the
artist
Lower cost for administration
3
Artist gets all "black box income" in the deal
Artist picks up minimum of approximately 20 percent additional
annual income
Record royalties and publishing put in special purpose vehicle
Corporations can do this transaction off balance sheet
Liquidity and diversity
Estate planning enables the artist's heirs to have cash available for
taxes so they won't have to sell catalogue
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BANK LOAN
Floating rate, if prime rate goes to 20 percent as in 1980, artist pays
20 percent plus spread over prime (i.e., 20 percent + 3 pts - 23 percent)
All assets of artist at risk
Bank lines typically limited to one year
Longest banks go out is 1-5 years
PUBLISHER'S ADVANCE
5-year range
Taxable event
Publishers want to buy copyright
Higher administrative cost, i.e., split higher to publishers for
administration when they advance millions of dollars
Publishers keep majority of black box in deal
1 Adapted from THE PULLMAN GROUP, LLC, BENEFITS OF MUSIC ANDENTERTAINMENT FUTURE
ADVANCE
(1998)
ROYALTIES
SECURITIZATION vs. BANK LOAN OR PUBLISHERs'S
2 "[C]ollections are periodically paid out to holders of interests rather than reinvested in new
receivables." Sam Adler, Using a Musician's Assets to Structure a Bond Offering, 13 No. 5
ENT. L. & FIN. 1 (1997).
3 "Black box income is an entertainment industry term that is meant to express the income
the record company is able to gain from activities other than direct sales of the artist's recordings. The 'black box' obscures the source of the income and eliminates the income by allocating expenses to the artist." John Jackson, Note, Royalty Securitization:Taking CABS to
Bankruptcy Court, 209 THOMAS JEFFERSON L. REV. 209, 218 n. 51. In a securitization deal,
black box income is minimized because the artist is now indirectly administrating. See Adler,
13 No. 5 ENT. L. & FIN. at 6.

1 Phil Leggiere, Rebel Rebel: Rocking the Bond Market, SUCCESS, Jan.
1999, at 58.
2 See Daniel Kadlec, The Real Price of Fame, TIME, Aug. 17, 1998, at
39; Gregory Zuckerman, James Brown's Got a Brand New Bag:
Issuing Bowie Bonds, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1999, at C21.
3 See generally Nicole Chu, Note, Bowie Bonds: A Key to Unlocking,
the Wealth of Intellectual Property,21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
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